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Son preference is prevalent in China. It is not only associated with an abnormally 
high fraction of male children in recent decades, but also influences parental joint 
decisions on time allocation. This thesis empirically estimates the effect of sons 
versus daughters on parental time allocation in rural China. To control for the 
endogeneity of child gender, instrumental-variables method is employed. In addition, 
fixed-effects estimation is used to validate the results from instrumental-variable 
estimation. 
We specify an empirical model to test the effect of child gender and gender 
composition on parental time allocation using data from 9 provinces in rural China in 
7 years. Employing a new instrumental variable for child gender and gender 
composition, which is the number of paternal brothers, we find a significant time 
reduction in maternal involvement in household chores with a presence of sons. 
Mothers with sons but no daughters have a significant time decrease in chores by 
33.30/0, compared to those with daughters but no sons. In addition, having at least one 
son and a first-born son decrease maternal time spent on household work by 36.3% 
and 27.30/0, respectively. We compare the results from instrumental-variable 
estimation with those under OLS estimation, and suggest that the upward bias in 
OLS coefficients may result from the unobserved heterogeneity in son preference 
across households. Furthennore, we employ a different empirical strategy under 








我們建立了實證模型，並且用 7 年 9 省中國農村地區的數據檢驗了孩子的性別
和性別組合對父母時間分配的影響 。 運用父親兄弟數日這一新的工具變量，我
們發現男孩導致母親顯著減少了做家務的時間。只有男孩的母親比只有女孩的
母親顯著減少了 33 . 泊的做家務時間。 至少有一個男孩的母親和第一個孩子是
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1. Introduction 
The sex ratio) In China has increased dramatically SInce the late 
1980s.1t rose from 108.5 in 1982 (Zeng et a!., 1993) to 110.9 in 1986 (Hull, 
1990), arrived at 111.9 in 1990 (Chu, 2001), and even reached 119.9 in 2000 
(NBS, 2002). Since the biologically normal ratio is about 106 boys to 100 
girls (Becker, 2007), this abnormally high sex ratio in China may result from 
sOIne underlying socioeconomic factors, which have drawn attention from 
many economists, sociologists, and demographers. They attribute it to a 
neglect of care for girls (Sen, 1990), prenatal sex-selective abortion (Zeng et 
a!., 1993; Chu, 2001), and even sex-selective infanticide (Banister, 1987). 
In addition to the abnormally high overall sex ratio, in recent decades much 
attention is paid to the high sex ratio at first births which was assumed to be 
nature. Li (2007) reports a sex ratio of 108.4 at first births with Chinese 
intercensal survey data. Ebenstein (2008) even depicts a sex ratio 
approaching 113 at first births in areas where only one child is allowed in 
China in 2000. 2 
Regarding the effects of increased sex ratio, researchers have explored 
its impacts on female intra-household bargaining power (Chiappori et al., 
2002), and labor supply (Angrist, 2002). In addition, concernIng its 
1 The sex ratio refers to the number of males per 100 females. 
2 Ebenstein (2008) classified Chinese parents into four categories according to different fertility limits: 
"those registered to an urban work zone are subject to the one child limit; those registered to a rural 
hukou are often allowed a second child if the first chi Id is a daughter; residents in autonomous regions 
are generally allowed a second birth; and ethnic minorities are subject to weaker regulations in almost 
all provinces." The depicted sex ratio approaching 113 at first births is restricted to the first category 
which is called "one child zone" by Ebenstein (2008). 
inter-generational influence, literature has explored the effect of child gender 
on parental labor supply in labor market (Lundberg & Rose, 2002; Choi et 
aI., 2008), and the effect of child gender on marriage (Morgan et al., 1988; 
Dahl & Moretti, 2008). However, to my best knowledge, little is known 
about the impact of child gender on parental joint decisions on time 
allocation between labor markets and households, especially in developing 
countries. It is partly due to a lack of micro data on time usage in households, 
and is further complicated by the possible endogeneity of child gender in 
those countries. In this thesis, we explore the impact of children's sex 
composition on parental time distribution between employed work and 
household chores. To expand the indicators describing child gender, we 
further investigate the effects of having at least one son and a first-born son 
on parental joint decision on time distribution, respectively. 
As indicated above, the overall sex ratio and the sex ratio at first births 
are abnormally high especially in recent decades in China, which indicate 
that there may be some underlying socioeconomic or cultural factors. These 
factors may not only affect the sex ratio, but also exert certain impacts on the 
household's time allocation decision. The traditional son preference is an apt 
example. On the one hand, Edlund (1999) pointed out that the biased sex 
ratio in China is a possible consequence of son preference, which lies in a 
tradition of patriarchy. On the other hand, as suggest by Cain, Khanam, and 
N ahar (1979), the tradition of patriarchy can further influence the way 
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couples allocate their time. Women tend to allocate more time into 
households, and men are more likely to be involved in income-earning work 
in a patriarchic society. In this case, son preference can affect the sex ratio as 
well as the time-allocation pattern simultaneously. Furthermore, the son 
preference is a kind of social norm which is difficult to measure and is 
usually unobservable to researchers. Thus the OLS estimate of the effect of 
child gender or gender composition on parental time allocation is biased, due 
to the unobserved heterogeneity of son preference across households . 
To address this problem, an instrumental-variable method is required. 
In this thesis we employ a new instrument for child gender: the number of 
paternal brothers. The validity of this instrument lies in the interacting 
influence between a prevalent son preference, a general equivalence among 
brothers (Das Gupta et aI., 2003), and a stringent birth control policy from 
1979 in China. Hence if a father has more brothers, he will have less burden 
of bearing a son of himself in order to carry on the family name, and 
therefore he will be less selective in the child gender. Our empirical results 
go with this prediction that in rural China the number of fathers' brothers has 
a negative and statistically significant correlation with children's sex 
composition3, the possibility of having at least one son, and the possibility of 
having a first-born son. 
Our empirical results from IV estimation concerning the effect of sons 
3 The sex composition of children refers to the share of male children among a ll children. 
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versus daughters on parental time allocation suggest that a presence of sons 
has a statistically significant influence on maternal time spent on household 
work. Mothers with boys but no girls have a significant time reduction of 
33.3% in household chores, compared to those with daughters but no sons. 
Having at least one son induces a significant time decrease in maternal 
chores by 36.30/0. A first-born son reduces mothers' time spent on household 
work by 27.3 % • We ascribe this decreased maternal time spent on household 
work to an increased female bargaining power. Mothers of sons are valued 
by the family, and have improved intra-household status. Thus they can 
enjoy a reduction in household-work time, with possibly more individual 
leisure. In addition, we compare the results under IV estimation with the 
corresponding ones under OLS estimation, and find that the coefficients 
under OLS estimation are consistently biased upward. We attribute it to the 
unobserved son preference in China. It is the son preference which is 
positively correlated with the children's sex composition and maternal time 
spent on chores simultaneously that biases the OLS estimates upward. 
To validate the results under IV estimation we employ a different 
empirical strategy of fixed-effects estimation to examine the effects of child 
gender or gender composition on parental time allocation. Since the son 
preference is assumed to be stable across time and the fixed-effects 
estimation can directly sweep off the household fixed characteristics such as 
son preference, the fixed effects estimates should be comparable to those 
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corresponding IV estimates. The estimated results under fixed-effects 
estimation consistently show that a presence of sons significantly reduces 
maternal time spent on household chores. However, under both IV 
estimation and fixed-effects estimation, sons do not have statistically 
significant influence on paternal time distribution between labor market and 
households, as well as maternal time spent on employment. 
This study may contribute to the literature in the following two ways. 
First, it validates the endogeneity of child gender in China, and explores a 
new instrument for it. Second, to my best knowledge, this is the first study 
exploring the effect of child gender on ' parental joint time allocation. The 
literature focuses either on one parent's time allocation or the parent' time 
distribution in either labor market or households (Bryant & Zick, 1996; 
Morgan et aI., 1988; Choi et aI., 2008). Furthermore, most of the literature 
on the relationship between child gender and parental time allocation is done 
with data from developed countries. In particular, little is know about the 
relationship in China, albeit son preference is prevalent and the sex ratio is 
seriously biased. 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the 
background information regarding son preference and unbalanced sex ratios 
in China. Section 3 reviews the literature and summarizes the mechanism by 
which child gender affects maternal and paternal time allocation. Section 4 
describes the empirical strategy and data set. Section 5 presents the 
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elnpirical results under ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation, 
instrumental-variable (IV) estimation and fixed-effects (FE) estimation. 
Section 6 concludes the thesis. 
2. Background 
2.1. Son Preference in China 
Son preference is prevalent In China. It is partly attributed to the 
traditional Confucian value, and further accelerated by the economic 
incentives of raising sons versus daughters. In China there is a rigid logic of 
patrilineality. Under this logic it is male's responsibility and rights to 
continue the family lines, by carrying on the family names. It is rare in rural 
China that a child inherits his/her mother's surname. Moreover it is stated in 
one classic work of Confucianism that bearing no sons is the worst form of 
unfilial conduct.4 
Besides the rigid logic of patrilineal kinship in China, the economic 
advantages of raising sons in rural China also add discrimination towards 
girls, and reinforce the son preference. To start with, the social welfare 
system in rural China is still under construction, and cannot guarantee 
old-age support for all rural residents . Aged parents usually live with their 
sons, and receive old-age support from them. Obtaining this kind of support 
is an important economic incentive for preferring sons to daughters. 
4 In Chapter 4 of Mengzi which is one of the most classic work of Confuciani sm, it is stated that 
"There are three form s of unfilial conducts, of which the worst is to bear no male heirs to continue the 
family line", 
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Moreover, men are considered much stronger than women, and therefore are 
believed to be more capable for the labor-intensive farm work. In rural 
China where modem agriculture technology is not prevalent, the raw labor 
force participation is of prilnary ilnportance in agriculture. It is indicated by 
Chinese respondents that "only men are strong enough to do the really hard 
work in the fields" (Das Gupta et aI., 2003), and men are considered to be of 
greater economic values to the family than women. From this perspective, 
male labor force participation in farm work is another source of economic 
incentive which exacerbates son preference. Last but not least, the payment 
of dowry increases discrimination towa'rds daughters as well. Although a 
son's marriage costs much more than the one of a daughter in China,s due to 
the logic of patrilineality, parents assume that the expense on sons is still a 
part of intra-household expense. To the contrary, however, the expense on 
dowry is supposed to be an investment on the daughter-in-law of another 
family (Das Gupta, et al., 2003). 
In addition to the traditional Confucian value which generates the son 
preference and the economic incentives which reinforce the son preference, 
the stringent birth control policy further exacerbates the discrimination 
towards girls. China's One Child Policy was implemented in 1979. Under 
this policy, a large proportion of couples are restricted to have one child only. 
5 Greenhalgh, Zhu & Li (1994) writes: "Sons are particularly expensive because they require a new 
house at the time of their marriage, The cost of marriage has grown to 'severa l tens of thousands' of 
yuan, almost ten times the annual income of the average family." Xie (1997) also writes: "In China 
and South Korea, the net expenses of a sons's marriage are estimated to be 3-4 times higher than that 
of a daughter's marriage." 
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Local governments impose fines on couples if they have births above legally 
assigned quota. Residents with urban Hukou are strictly restricted to have 
one child only. People in some rural areas are allowed to have a second birth 
if the first child is a girl. Households of the Han which are the largest ethnic 
group in China are generally restricted to have one child only, though there 
are certain exceptions such as living in rural or remote mountainous areas, or 
having a disabled or adopted first child, etc. (Qian, 1997). Policy on ethic 
minorities is much looser. Households of minorities are usually allowed to 
have a second birth or even more. However, in the 1990s, enforcement of the 
birth control policy became much stricter (Ebenstein, 2008). In this scenario, 
the sex of the only child in the household becomes more significant to 
parents influenced by the traditional son preference. 
In China's context of One Child Policy with a traditional son 
preference, the widely used ultrasound technology further facilitates the sex 
selection. This technology was first introduced in the early 1980s with an 
aim of pregnancy monitoring. However it was then abused in the 1990s and 
employed as a Inethod of sex-selective abortion. Though prenatal sex 
determination and sex-selective abortion are stated illegal and forbidden by 
the government, they are still frequently practised in rural China through 
bribing or personal connection (Chu, 2001). This technology can detect the 
sex of a fetus in the early 20 weeks of a pregnancy (Ebenstein, 2008), and 
facilitate an abortion of child with a disfavored gender. 
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2.2. Unbalanced Sex Ratio in China 
With traditional son preference and developed ultrasound technology 
in the context of birth control policy, the sex ratio began to rise dramatically 
from the late 1980s. In 1982, the sex ratio in China was estimated as 108.5 
(Zeng et aI., 1993). In 1986, it was 110.9 (Hull, 1990). It arrived at 111.9 in 
1990 (Chu, 2001), and even reached 119.9 in 2000 (NBS, 2002). This 
unbalanced sex ratio receives increasingly more attention from economists, 
sociologists, and demographists. Sen initially pointed out a phenomenon of 
"missing girls" in 1990. He estimated that there were 50 million Chinese 
women missing due to neglect of care and mistreatInent. Using census data, 
some researchers claim that sex-selective abortion is responsible for the 
rising sex ratio, in addition to the increasing underreport of female births 
(Zeng et al., 1993; Li, 1993; Chu, 2001). In addition, it is argued that the 
rising sex ratio can be due to certain biological reason, such as the hepatitis 
B (Oster, 2005), though later evidence shows that this biological factor 
cannot explain the scenarios in China (Lin & Luoh, 2008; Oster & Chen, 
2008). 
In addition to the overall unbalanced sex ratios, in recent years many 
researchers pay attention to the sex ratio at first births. In industrial world 
the sex ratio of first births is generally considered to be natural or random. 
Some researchers have created instrumental variables using information 
related to the first child's gender, given its exogeneity. Angrist & Evans 
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(1998) employed the gender composition of the first two births as an 
instrument to examIne the effects of fertility on female labor supply. 
Rosenzweig & Wolpin (1980a, 1980b) used whether the first birth included 
twins as instrument for fertility. Recent research on industrial countries still 
follows their methods (Frenette, 2008). 
However, in China the sex ratio of first births appears to be 
abnormally high, which implies a problem of endogeneity. The sex ratio at 
first births approached 107 in the early 1990s (Gu & Roy, 1995).6 Under the 
Chinese intercensal survey in 2005, it is found that the sex ratio at first births 
reach 108.4 (Li, 2007). Moreover, in the one child zone in China, the 
fraction of male among first births approach 0.53 in 2000, which indicates a 
sex ratio of 113 boys to 100 girls at first births (Ebenstein, 2008). Though 
former research has detected this abnormal unbalanced sex ratio at first 
births, to my best knowledge, no systematic analysis regarding this problem 
has been done yet. 
3. Literature Review 
In this section we review the literature, and summarize the mechanism 
by which child gender influences parental time allocation. Firstly, we 
summarize the reasons why parents invest differently in sons and daughters. 
The observed preference for sons can be interpreted by gender bias from one 
6 It is reported that in 1992 the sex ratio at first birth was 106.7. In 1993 the sex ratio at first birth was 
105.6. 
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or both parents, or can be explained by the comparative advantage of parents 
in raising children with the same sex as that of the parent. Secondly, we 
present the channels through which child gender affects each parent's time 
allocation and reVIew existing empirical literature on the relationship 
between child gender and parental time allocation. The channels are 
classified as increased female bargaining power, a demonstration effect, and 
a specialization effect. 
3.1. Reasons for Different Investment in Sons and Daughters 
Parents invest in sons and daughters differently. To explain this 
difference in parental behaviors, Lundberg (2005) classifies the possible 
detenninants into "variation in preferences" and "variation in constraints". 
Dahl & Moretti (2008) offer more detailed interpretations for the gender 
differences, which include gender bias, role model hypothesis, technological 
reasons, differential cost hypothesis, and compensatory behavior hypothesis. 
Mainly based on these two references, and together with other work 
regarding the gender differences (Ben-Porath & Welch, 1976; Davies & 
Zhang, 1995), we summarize the reasons for different investment in sons 
and daughters into two categories, which are gender bias and differences in 
comparative advantage of parents in raising children with the same sex. 
11 
Channel 1. Gender Bias 
In this channel, parents invest differently in sons and daughters either 
because of having a pure taste towards certain gender, or taking the different 
earning opportunities between sons and daughters into consideration. 
Concerning the pure taste, sons and daughters generate different utility for 
one or both parents. In a society with son preference, parents derive more 
utility from sons than daughters. The marginal value of one additional boy 
outweighs the marginal value of one additional girl, if boys' number equals 
that of girls. In China, the difference in utility between sons and daughters 
origins from the patrilineal kinship. Giving birth to a son means a continuity 
of family lines, which is important to the whole family. In addition, 
concerning the different earning opportunities between sons and daughters, 
the economic benefits of raising boys further exacerbate the gender bias. 
Sons can provide old-age support to parents, be involved in the 
labor-intensive farm work, and have a potentially higher wage rate than 
daughters in China. In Dahl & Moretti (2008), they argue the economic 
benefit as a "differential cost" hypothesis, which means a different monetary 
or time cost of raising boys and girls. However, we think that it can be 
included in our channel of "gender bias", since these exogenous factors, 
such as wages and prices, can generate a bias towards certain gender as well. 
In addition, Dahl & Moretti themselves have argued that "we do not think of 
the five explanations presented above as mutually exclusive. More than one 
12 
explanation could very well be at play" (pp 1102), which implies that several 
of their classifications can be aggregated. Furthennore, as indicated by 
Pollak & Wachter (1975), to examine the price of a home-produced 
cOlnmodity, such as a child, should consider both the household's preference 
and the exogenous prices in the market, which also underline the 
significance of taking market prices and parental taste together into concern. 
Channel 2. Comparative Advantage 
Compared to channel 1 in which parents invest differently to sons and 
daughters through a bias towards certain gender, in channel 2 parents have 
unbiased gender preference but a comparative advantage in raising child 
with the same gender. It is similar as the constraint-based explanation in 
Lundberg (2005), which assumes that male and female children have 
different production functions. The optimal inputs of resources from fathers 
and mothers may differ in the production functions of boys versus girls. For 
instance, a father may be more productive in raising boys than a mother 
since his time spent with sons is more effective in molding boys' male 
characteristics. Moreover, in a state of divorce boys may suffer a greater loss 
since it is harder for them to obtain the companion from fathers , given it is 
customary that mothers obtain the custody rights after divorce (Lundberg 
2005). Empirical evidence bolsters this argument and mainly focuses on the 
effectiveness of fathers in producing sons' quality, and the loss of welfare for 
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boys in divorce (Morgan et al. 1988; Hetherington & Kelly, 2002). 
Researchers have explored different indicators measuring the outcome 
of the different treatment towards sons and daughters, such as investment in 
human capital (Ahmand & Morduch, 1993), children's health status 
(Thomas, 1990; Sen, 1998), and household consumption expenditure 
(Deaton, 1987). In addition, empirical research regarding son preference in 
China has been done using these indicators as well (Yu & Sarri, 1997; Lee, 
2007; Song, 2008). However, these indicators suffer from certain problems. 
Either human capital or health status may suffer from serious measurement 
problems or only suitable under extreme 'cases (Lee, 2007). In addition, they 
aim at the quality of children, which results from parental gender 
discrimination, and therefore is not a direct measurement of parental gender 
bias. Regarding the indicator of consumption expenditure, though it is a 
direct measurement of parental behaviors, the "adult goods" on which 
children are assumed to have a negative income effect, is difficult to define. 
In our exploration, we explore the parental time allocation between the labor 
market and household, which is a direct measurement of parental behaviors. 
We intend to investigate whether parents distribute their time in any 
gender-biased manner. 
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3.2. The Mechanism by Which Child gender Affects Parental Time 
Allocation 
Based on the different value between sons and daughters, parents 
allocate their time differently. In this section we summarize the literature and 
classify three channels through which child gender can influence parental 
time allocation, which are a change in female intra-household bargaining 
power, a demonstration effect, and a specialization effect. 
Channel 1. Bargaining power 
This channel is associated with parental gender bias. If fathers do have 
a taste on sons rather than daughters, a birth of male children will generate a 
utility bonus to men. In a standard divorce-threat bargaining model (Manser 
& Brown, 1980; McElroy & Homey, 1981), it will change the threat point of 
divorce. A part of this utility bonus to fathers is then allocated to mothers 
through intra-household bargaining rules. In this case, the birth of sons will 
bring welfare to mothers, improve their family status, and increase the 
female intra-household bargaining power. Economists have investigated the 
intra-household bargaining problems, and explored different indicators 
measuring the bargaining outcome. Zhang & Chan (1999) use "husband 's 
help with chores" to proxy for the intra-household bargaining outcome, and 
find that a dowry enhances the bargaining power of the bride in the 
allocation of intra-household output. Brown (2009) expands more indicators 
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reflecting the wife's bargaining outcome in the allocation of intra-household 
output and therefore her welfare,7 and demonstrates similar positive impact 
of dowry on wife's welfare. Although in Brown's paper fertility is 
considered as one regressor, no further exploration of the relationship 
between child gender and the female intra-household bargaining 
elnpowerment is implemented. Consistent with the literature, we include 
parents' involvement In household chores as a proxy for a bargaining 
outcome, and further explore the effect of child gender on parental time 
allocation. It is expected that through this channel, female time spent on 
household chores will be decreased with cl presence of sons. 
Channel 2. Demonstration effect 
The demonstration effect is closely associated with the comparative 
advantage of a parent in raising a child with the same sex. The production 
function of sons differs from that of daughters, and paternal and maternal 
optimal time investment in boys and girls differs as well. If fathers are truly 
more productive and effective in molding boys ' quality, they will be more 
likely to increase their time with sons. This effect is firstly argued in an early 
sociology paper (Morgan et aI., 1988), which underlines that fathers have a 
special role in developing boys ' characters. Lundberg & Rose (2002) further 
7 The indicators include the wife 's total leisure time, the total time that husbands allocate to the 
household chores, the husband's share of the couple 's time devoted to shores, the wife's share of the 
couple 's total lei sure time, the share of annual household accruing to women 's goods, the wife 's 
self-reported satisfaction, and the wife's decision-making authority. 
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claim it as a demonstration effect, and believe that fathers are more 
important in modeling the traditional social role for sons than for daughters. 
Empirical evidence on the parent-child shared time also supports this 
demonstration effect. It reveals that fathers spend more time with sons while 
mothers spend more time with daughters (Morgan et al., 1988; Yeung et al., 
1999). It is expected that under this effect, parents will spend more time with 
the child with the same sex than with the opposite gender. Specifically, with 
a presence of sons, fathers are expected to spend more time in the 
households, accompanying their boys. 
Channel 3. Specialization effect 
A third channel through which child gender can influence parental 
time allocation is the specialization effect. It is firstly introduced by Becker 
(1985) which claims that as childcare and household work are effort-
intensive and are normally the responsibility of women, an increase in 
fertility among women equates to reduced labor supply in labor market and 
increased time spent on household chores. On the contrary, male labor 
supply is expected to increase to make up for the foregone income of their 
spouses. 
Taking the child gender into consideration, a son will increase marital 
stability than a daughter in a society with son preference, no matter through 
the channels of gender bias or comparative advantage. On the one hand, if 
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men prefer boys to girls, a presence of sons will enhance men's willingness 
to remain in the marriage. On the other hand, if men do not have gender bias 
but a comparative advantage in developing sons' characteristics, it will be 
costly for fathers to provide this comparative advantage to sons in a state of 
divorce. From this perspective a presence of sons will increase the marital 
stability as well. 
With an increased stability of marriage, parents of sons will have a 
different strategy in making time-allocation decisions from those of 
daughters. They are inspired to make more family-specific investments, such 
as purchasing durable goods, or having a specialization among couples. 
Fathers are expected to specialize in the market work, while mothers in 
household chores. In addition, in the Chinese context boys are more costly 
because of a high bride price. It further propels father of sons to specialize in 
labor market in order to accumulate more household income, and mothers of 
sons to specialize in the households. Lundberg & Rose (2002) find that a 
presence of children increases fathers' time on working in labor market 
using US data, and claim that the effects of boys are significantly larger. 
Choi et al. (2008) demonstrate similar results with Gennan data. It is 
expected that through this channel, fathers of boys will denote more time to 
employed work, while mothers of boys will allocate more time into 
households. 
In sum, sons differ from daughters in both utility generated for parents 
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and the production functions. Parents with sons make different decisions in 
joint time allocation from those with daughters, through the channels of the 
bargaining power, demonstration, and specialization effects. In each channel, 
the effect of child gender on paternal time allocation is different. Firstly, 
through the channel of bargaining-power effect, with a presence of sons, 
maternal time spent on household chores as well as on employment is 
expected to decrease because of a raised female status. To compensate for 
the time loss, the paternal time spent on household work and employment 
are expected to increase. Secondly, through the channel of the demonstration 
effect, fathers with sons are expected to allocate more time into households, 
mode ling the traditional male roles for boys. Their time spent in labor 
lnarket is therefore reduced. Responding to the time change of fathers, 
mothers of sons are expected to increase the time spent in labor market, and 
decrease their time in households. Thirdly, through the channel of the 
specialization effect, fathers of sons are expected to spend more time in 
labor market and mothers of sons are expected to distribute more time into 
households. Paternal time spent on household chores and the maternal time 
in labor market are therefore expected to be reduced. What is worth 
emphasizing is that the three effects are not mutually exclusive. Several 
effect(s) can exist at the same time. The separate and joint effects of sons 
versus daughters through the three channels are described in Table 1. The 
last row summarizes the overall influence of child gender on parental time 
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allocation. It is shown that under the influence of the three effects, the 
overall impact of sons versus daughters on parental time allocation is 
indeterminate, which requires an empirical exploration. 
There is SOlne literature exploring the correlation between children 
and parental joint decision on time allocation. Regarding the effects of 
fertility on parental joint decisions, Frenette (2008) reports an increase in 
maternal unpaid hours and a decrease in their paid hours with an increase in 
fertility. No significant impact is found of fertility on paternal paid hours . A 
slight decrease in fathers' unpaid hours is observed. Regarding the effects of 
children on parental time allocation in China, Li & Zhang (2006) find that 
the variation of fertility does not have a significant impact on either male or 
female working time in rural China. They attribute this insignificance to the 
childcare provided by non-parental household members. Consistent with this 
work, we take the effects of other household members into our regression 
examining parental time allocation. Regarding the effects of the first child 's 
gender, Lundberg & Rose (1999) find an increase in specialization among 
couples, and a decrease in market intensity with a first-born child. Lundberg 
(2005) points out two inadequacies in the existing literature regarding the 
effect of child gender on parental time distribution. The first is a lack of 
evidence with data outside US , and the second is a lack of test distinguishing 
the preference-driven effect and the constraint-driven effect. In this thesis , 
we employ a micro-level data set from rural China, which is rarely dealt 
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with before. In addition, if we can distinguish between the bargaining power 
effect and demonstration effect, we could be able to distinguish between 
their sole underlying driven force of gender bias and comparative advantage, 
which correspond to "preference" and "constraint" in Lundberg (2005) 
respectively. We implement an empirical examination with 
instrumental-variable estimation in the following section. 
4. Empirical Strategy and Data Description 
In order to examine the effect of child gender on parental time 
allocation empirically, we incorporate variables reflecting child gender into 
the time allocation equation. In this section we firstly specify the empirical 
strategy dealing with the problem of endogeneity of child gender, and then 
describe the micro-level data derived from rural China. 
4.1. Empirical Strategy 
To explore the effect of child gender on parental time allocation, we 
start with a specification of three variables describing child gender and 
gender composition, which are the overall sex composition, the possibility of 
having at least one son, and the possibility of having a first-born son. We 
then regress each parent's time spent on employed work and household 
chores on the three variables, respectively. The first semi-log regression 
equation is as follow: 
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Ln Yil == aO + alsexcomil + X'il a x + ~ + Y, + eil 
i==l, ... ,N; t==l, ... ,T, 
where the subscript i and t indicate household and time separately. 
Yit is the outcome of interest, which is each parent's time spent on 
employment and household chores.8 
sexcomil indicates the sex composition of children. It refers to the 
share of male children in all children. 
XiI is a vector of control variables for individuals, which includes 
each parent's age, schooling years, ethnic identity, and the number of old 
people living in the household.9 
~ stands for provincial dummies which capture the unobserved 
province-specific heterogeneity. Y, denotes a set of year dummies which 
capture the time variations in time allocation patterns common to all 
individuals. Ei, denotes the error term, which is assumed to be i. i. d, having a 
zero mean and constant variance. 
I am interested in the coefficient aI' which captures the impact of the 
children's sex composition on parents' time allocation in employed work and 
household chores. The predicted sign of a l is indeterminate, as discussed in 
section 3. Moreover, this test is complicated by the potential endogeneity of 
8 For some individuals the Yil can be equal to O. Ifwe take the Ln fonn directly on these observations, 
the results go to negative infinity. To solve this problem, we add I unit to all Yil, and then take the Ln 
fonn. It is expressed as Ln (Yil+ I) . Due to the monotony of Ln, this method can still capture the 
percentage change in Yil' For simplicity, we write Ln Yil only in the specification . 
9 Old people are defined as those age above 65 years old . According to a governmental document 
"Report on the Development of Civil Affairs in 2006" (2006 nian min zheng shi ye fa zhan tong j i bao 
gao) published by the Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People 's Republic of China, the definition of 
elder people is people above 65 years old. 
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(1) 
the children's sex composition, sexcomil • There may be some omitted 
variables in Cif' which are correlated with the children's sex composition 
and parental decisions on time allocation simultaneously. The household-
heterogeneous son preference is an apt example. As indicated by Edlund 
(1999), "the unbalanced sex ratios are but one of several possible 
consequences of a preference for sons", which reveals a correlation between 
son preference and sex ratios. In addition, son preference lies in a tradition 
of patriarchy which can also influence the way couples distribute their time. 
Cain, Khanam, and Nahar (1979) explored the pattern of couple's time 
allocation using micro-level data from Bangladesh. They found that women 
in a society with strict patriarchy allocated most of their time to home 
production, while men distributed most of their time to income-earning work. 
It reveals a correlation between patriarchy, and therefore son preference, and 
parental time-allocation pattern. Hence it is possibly the unobserved son 
preference that correlates with sex composition as well as parental time 
allocation, and therefore causes the problem of endogeneity. In this case, the 
results from traditional OLS estimation can be biased. An 
instrumental-variable estimation is then used to identify the effect of sex 
composition of children on parental time allocation. 
With Zif denoting a vector of instruments for children's sex 
composition, the model to identify the causal relationship between these 
instruments and the children's sex composition is specified as follow: 
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sexcomif = a'O + a'IZif + X 'ifa 'X + P; + ~ + cif 
i=l, ... ,N; t=l, ... ,T, 
(2) 
The estimated sex composition is then inserted into regression (1) to 
carry out a two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation testing the real effect 
of sex composition on parental time allocation. We will introduce our 
instruments and justify its validity in section 5.2. 
In addition to examining the impact of sex composition on parental 
time allocation, we then analyze the influence of having at least one son on 
parental time distribution. The reason why we shift to the possibility of 
having at least one son is as follows: in the Chinese society with a strong son 
preference, a woman's intra-household status is improved once she becomes 
the mother of one son. Through the channel of female intra-household 
bargaining power, the mother is expected to spend less time on household 
chores once she has a boy. In addition, considering each parent's 
comparative advantage in raising child with the same sex, a father 's 
comparative advantage comes into practice once he has a son. Through the 
channel of the demonstration effect, the father's time in household is 
expected to be increased with at least one son. From these two points of view, 
whether the parents have at least one son is likely to be more influential than 
the exact number of sons. Hence we generate a dummy of dson jf , which 
represents the scenario of having at least one son. dson j , equals 1 if there is 
at least one son in the household. Otherwise it equals O. The equation is the 
same as Eq. (1) except we replace sexcom j f with dson jf • 
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Similarly as sex composition, dsoni/ suffers from a problem of 
potential endogeneity. The reason is similar as what we have discussed 
before. Driven by son preference, parents will try every method to have at 
least one son which will affect their joint decisions on time allocation as well. 
This situation is even exacerbated in the context of China's stringent birth 
control policy, which lowers the possibility that parents can obtain a boy. 
Hence a 2SLS estimation is needed to examine the real effect of at least one 
son on parental time allocation as well. 
In addition to investigating the effects of sex composition and having 
at least son on parental time allocation, we also analyze the impact of the 
first child's gender on parents' joint decision on time distribution. It is 
because that though in general sons are equal, due to the primogeniture "the 
oldest son is viewed as the senior and therefore second in authority only to 
the father" (Das Gupta et aI., 2003). A first-born son not only changes the 
family structure, but is also expected to generate a greater utility bonus to 
parent(s) than sons in higher birth orders. Hence we specify a dummy 
variable of fson il • It equals 1 if there is at least one child and the first child 
is boy. Otherwise it equals O. The empirical specification is similar as Eq. (1) 
except replacing sexcomil with fson i, • 
Though the first child's gender is widely considered to be nature or 
random in developed countries, in China and especially the rural parts it is 
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probably non-random. 10 It IS possibly endogenous because of the 
sex-selective abortion in the context of the One-Child Policy. From the 
1990s, the enforcement of the One Child Policy is even stricter than 
before. I I Influenced by the traditional son preference, parents under the 
pressure of the stringent birth control may limit fertility but pay more 
attention to the gender of the only child they can conceive. They may abort a 
child in the process of conceiving if they detect it is a girl. The development 
of sex selection technology further enables this abortion. 
In this case, IV(s) for the first child's gender is required as well. We 
will introduce our instrument, and justify ' its validity in Section 5. Empirical 
exploration under IV estimation is implemented in that section to test the 
effect of child gender on parental time allocation as well. 
4.2. Data Description 
The micro data employed to implement the IV estimation are derived 
from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS). It was collected by the 
Carolina Population Center at the University of North Carolina at Chapel 
Hill, the National Institute of Nutrition and Food Safety, and the Chinese 
Center for Disease Control and Prevention, covering waves of 1989, 1991, 
1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, and 2006 in 9 provinces. The provinces under 
survey in each year are depicted in Figure 1. The benefit of using this data 
10 This question has been mentioned and discussed in section 2. 
11 Ebenstein (2008) writes: "The analysis reveals several alarming patterns, such as a steep rise in the 
sex ratio of first births during the 1990's in the wake of stricter enforcement of the One Child Policy." 
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set extends to several dimensions. First of all, it contains detailed 
information on each individual's time usage. All adults are asked questions 
on their time spent on the first and second job with regular wage income, 
and the time spent on farms and in gardens per week in rural China. In 
addition, time on different household chores is collected, such as weekly 
time spent on purchasing food, preparing and cooking food, as well as 
washing and ironing clothes. Secondly, marriage, pregnancy and birth 
history, as well as individual's sibling information and the sibling 
composition of spouse are asked for each ever-married woman under the age 
of 52. This information on marriage, sibling, and inter-generation linkages 
will facilitate our identification of couples, siblings, and parents. Last but not 
least, follow-up levels are high across seven waves. Families remaining in 
their old sites are revisited, while new families appearing in the target 
communities are interviewed and added to the whole sample. This high 
follow-up rate will facilitate our identification of household unobserved 
heterogeneity. 
Our sample contains 2375 observations in rural China with intact 
information on time allocation and child gender, as well as other basic 
demographic information, such as age, schooling years, ethnic identity, and 
number of old people living in the households. All the couples have at least 
one child. In addition, we restrict mothers' age to be older than 20 and 
younger than 52. It is due to the fact that in China the legal age of marriage 
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for women is 20. Moreover, in the CHNS data, women equal to or above 52 
years old are not subject to the survey on birth history. Furthermore, we limit 
the first child to be younger than 18 years old. It is because that those 
children at the age of 18 or above are likely to leave their parents' home for 
study or work, or even form their own families. In this case, these old 
children may not exert a direct influence on the parental time allocation 
through the channel of the demonstration effect. 12 In addition, the first child 
is restricted to be those of single birth. Twins on first birth are deleted since 
they will affect the parents' time allocation not only through a channel of 
gender, but also through an increased number of children, compared to the 
single births. 
The objective of the IV method is to examine the effect of sons versus 
daughters on parental time allocation. The dependent variables are maternal 
or paternal time spent on employment and household chores, which is 
measured in the unit of hours per week. Time on employment is defined as 
the summation of time spent on the first and second jobs with regular wage 
income and self-employed work on farms and in gardens. Household chores 
include purchasing food, preparing and cooking food, as well as washing 
clothes and ironing clothes. 
Table 2 describes the mean and standard deviation of key variables for 
12 We have tried to put no restriction on the first child's age. The regression results are similar as those 
to be presented below. The reason why we present results with first child under 18 in this thesis is that 
we would like to report results from families with the most similar structure and therefore with least 
confusion. 
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couples in rural China. On average, men in rural areas work around 45 hours 
per week while women contribute approximately 41 hours to work. In 
households, however, women spend 19.516 hours per week on household 
chores. Male time on household chores is only 2.588 hours per week. The 
average ages for fathers and mothers are 35.235 and 33.888 respectively. 
Rural fathers have 8.228 years of education on average, while the 
corresponding accumulated educational years for mothers is 7.523 on 
average. It indicates that in this sample both parents reach an average 
educational level of junior high school, although paternal educational level is 
slightly superior to the one of mothers: Regarding the ethnic identity of 
parents, 86.50/0 of fathers and 85.8% of mothers belong to the category of 
han, respectively. In addition, each couple in this sample has 0.171 old 
people living in the household. 
Considering the information regarding children, it is found that each 
couple has 1.678 children on average, which implies a much larger number 
than the one child regulated by the birth control policy. 13 The sex 
composition is 0.580 which is biased towards boys. Also, it is found that 
75.60/0 of the rural couples have at least one son. Regarding the gender of the 
first-born child, it is 0.541 on average. 
Bearing the comparison of summary statistics of rural fathers and 
mothers in mind, and taking the gender bias towards boys into consideration, 
13 In certain rural areas, a second child is allowed by the policy if the first child is a girl. It is so ca lled 
a "1.5 child policy" (Ebenstein, 2008). Even taking this scenario into consideration , the average 1. 678 
children still exceed the number regulated by the policy. 
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we carry out the empirical analysis in the next section. 
5. Empirical Results 
In this section we systematically examine the effect of sons versus 
daughters on parental time allocation. We firstly present the basic results of 
OLS estimation, and then verify the validity of the instruments empirically 
and carry out the IV estimation. Fixed-effect estimation is implemented in 
order to test the validity of the results from IV estimation as well. 
5.1. OLS Estimation 
To start with, we carry out ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of 
Eq. (1) to explore the effect of sons versus daughters on parental time 
allocation. Table 3 presents the OLS estimates examining the effects of sex 
composition of children on each parent's time distribution between 
employment and household chores. Parental age dummies as well as 
provincial dummies and survey year dummies are included though not 
reported. Columns (1) - (2) show the effects of children's sex composition 
on paternal time spent on employment and household chores. Columns (3) -
(4) present the corresponding results for maternal time allocation. 
In column (2) in Table 3 it is found that with a change in children's 
sex composition from all girls to all boys, fathers reduce their time spent on 
household chores by 110/0. This coefficient is statistically significant at the 
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50/0 level. Regarding the effects of sex composition on other dependent 
variables, however, none of them are significantly different from zero. It 
seems that a large proportion of male children can affect paternal time in 
households though it is too early to draw the conclusion. We then take a look 
at the effects of having at least one son and a first-born son on parental time 
allocation under OLS estimation. 
Table 4 reports the 0 LS estimates examining the effect of having at 
least one son on parental time allocation. It is discovered that with at least 
one son paternal time on household chores is reduced by 15.90/ 0 (column (2)), 
and maternal time on chores is increased-by 4.8 010 (column (4)) . Both of the 
two coefficients are statistically significant at a high level of 1 0/ 0. It seems 
that with at least one son, the household chores are shifted from fathers to 
mothers, which corresponds to one aspect of the specialization effect. In 
addition, having at least one son does not have statistically significant effects 
on both parents ' time spent in labor market. This pattern is consistent wi th 
the one revealed in Table 3. 
Furthermore, we check the effect of a first-born son on parental time 
allocation, and report the results in Table 5. Compared with a first-born girl , 
a first-born boy does not have any statistically significant influence on 
parental time allocation under OLS estimation. 
In sum, concerning the effect of sons versus daughters on parental 
time distribution under OLS estimation, both a high fraction of male 
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children and a presence of at least one son reduce the time of household 
work by fathers. In addition, the presence of at least one son results in an 
increase in maternal chores' time as well. Among all the indicators reflecting 
child gender and gender composition, the possibility of having at least one 
son has the most significant impact on parental time distribution under OLS 
estimates. However, as we have discussed above, the coefficients under OLS 
estimation can be biased, and thus an instrumental-variable estimation IS 
required. We will introduce the IV estimation in the next section in detail. 
Regarding the coefficients of other control variables, all of them are 
consistent in signs and similar in magnitude from Table 3 to Table 5, and 
therefore we describe them together. Regarding the effect of ethnic identity 
on parental time allocation, being a Han increases maternal time spent on 
household chores by around 5% in each regression. The coefficients are all 
statistically significant at the level of 100/0 in each table. It implies that a 
mother of han spends more time on household chores on average than a 
mother of minority on average. 
Regarding the effect of education on parental time allocation, fathers' 
time on employment as well as household chores is increased with 
educational years. A one-year increase in paternal education increases 
fathers' time spent on employment and chores by approximately 13% and 
40/0 respectively. The coefficients are statistically significant at a high 1 % 
level across each table. It indicates that fathers with a higher level of 
32 
education spend longer hours in labor market as well as households than 
those with a lower educational level. The possible reasons are as follows: on 
the one hand, regarding the effect of education on men's time in labor 
market, it is probable that fathers equipped with more education are more 
capable in obtaining jobs. On the other hand, regarding the effect of 
education on men's time in household, those men with high level of 
education possibly have stronger commitment to the family and therefore are 
likely to spend longer hours at home. Turning to the mothers' side, however, 
with one-year increase in maternal educational level, mothers reduce their 
time spent on employment and household chores by approximately 1.5 0/0 and 
0.4%, respectively. It is likely to be consistent with the Iyigun & Walsh 
(2005) which indicates a positive correlation between female education and 
bargaining power. With an increased bargaining power, those mothers 
possibly allocate more time to leisure, and therefore have a time reduction in 
employment and household chores. 
Finally, regarding the effects of old people in the household on 
parental time allocation, with an increasing number of old people, paternal 
time spent on employment and household chores is decreased by 
approximately 14% and 80/0 across each table, respectively. The two 
coefficients are statistically significant at the 50/0 level and the 10% level 
respectively. Turning to the side of mothers, an increase in old people 's 
number reduces maternal chores' time by around 3.70/0 per week, and is 
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statistically significant at the 50/0 level in each table. It indicates that under 
the OLS estimation, an increase in the number of old people in the 
household significantly reduces fathers' time in labor market and their time 
spent on household chores. In addition, maternal time spent on household 
work is decreased as well. It is probably because that in rural China aged 
people usually live with one of their sons and obtain old-age support from 
him and his family. Since these aged people need to be taken care of, the 
father (who is usually the son of the old people) has to reduce their time 
spent on employed work. Considering the significant negative effect of old 
people on the couples' time spent on household chores, it is consistent with 
the fact that in rural China aged people usually involve in the household 
work, and help the young couples. 
5.2. Instrumental-Variables Estimation 
Although the OLS estimates show that sons have different effects 
from daughters on parental time allocation, we should be cautious with these 
results because they can be biased by the problem of endogeneity.14 To 
solve this problem, we apply an instrumental-variables estimation to identify 
the causal effect of the child gender on parental time allocation. In this 
section we firstly verify the validity of the instrument we propose, and then 
conduct the first-stage estimation. After that we present the results from 
14 As discussed in section 4. 1, results under OLS estimation can be biased by some unobserved 
factors, such as the son preference which can be correlated with both the child gender and parental 
time allocation. 
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two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation. Finally we compare the estimated 
coefficients from 2SLS estimates with those from OLS estimates, and 
provide possible explanation for the change in coefficients. 
We propose a new instrument for child gender and gender composition: 
the number of paternal brothers. We use this instrument and its interaction 
terms with parental educational years and ethnic identity as a set of 
instruments in the 2SLS estimation. Serving as good instruments for child 
gender and gender composition, there are two criteria. Firstly, they should be 
closely correlated with the three variables reflecting child gender or gender 
composition. Secondly, the instruments ' should be uncorrelated with the 
parental time allocation beyond the direct effect through child gender or 
gender composition. Based on the two criteria we check the validity of our 
instruments in order. 
Firstly, influenced by Confucian value, Chinese people especially 
those in rural areas have a firm logic of patrilineal kinship. Continuing the 
male family lines and carrying on family names are considered of great 
importance. If a father is the only male in his generation, he and his wife will 
have a high tendency to give birth to a son, in order to continue the father's 
surname. Otherwise his family name will be lost, which is a great loss to the 
whole family. Evidences bolster a relationship between the number of 
paternal brothers and the child gender. In a field work in rural central China 
by Chu (2001), interviewed women expressed that they "feel especially 
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strongly obligated to have a son if their husband is the only male child of the 
family". Das Gupta et at. (2003) also discuss about "the principle of equality 
of brothers (in China)", which "introduces an element of flexibility" between 
sons of brothers. Although in Das Gupta et at. (2003) they mention the 
general equality among brothers in China in order to argue that "those (men) 
without sons can be sustained in this life and the afterlife by their brothers' 
sons", it also reveals the possible substitution between a man's sons and his 
brothers' sons in the family system. 
Taking the flexibility of brothers' sons into consideration, a negative 
correlation between the gender composition of a man's children and the 
number of his brothers is expected. The more brothers the father has, the 
larger possibilities with which his brothers will have sons, and therefore the 
less burden the father bears of carrying on the family name. In this case he 
will be less selective in the gender of his own children, and therefore the 
children's sex composition is expected to be lower. Regarding the 
relationship between paternal brothers' number and the possibility of having 
at least one son as well as a first son, the logic is similar. A father with more 
brothers will have lower expectation of having at least one boy and care less 
about the sex of the first child, since his brothers have dispersed the pressure 
of giving birth to at least one male child or having an oldest boy in the next 
generation. In this scenario, a negative correlation is expected between 
paternal brothers' number and the possibility of having at least one son or a 
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first-born son. Intuitively, this negative relationship between number of 
paternal brothers and children's sex composition, the possibility of having at 
least one son as well as a first-born son is shown in Figures 2 - 4 
respectively, although further empirical evidence is required. 
Secondly, regarding the second criterion of good instruments, it IS 
unlikely that the number of paternal brothers can be directly correlated with 
decisions of time allocation among the couple. In China sons usually 
establish separate households and do not co-reside with their brothers after 
marriage. In this case the couple is independent in their decision-making of 
time allocation, and unlikely to be influenced by their brothers. Although 
they may receive some help from brothers and their families, such kind of 
help is not considered to be great enough to affect the individual couple's 
decisions of intra-household time distribution. 
We then conduct the first-stage estimation in order to test the validity 
of the set of instruments empirically. Table 6 reports the first-stage results of 
IV estimation for the children's sex composition. The first three columns 
present the first-stage results by regressing the sex composition on number 
of paternal brothers, its interaction with maternal ethnic identity, and its 
interaction with maternal education, respectively. The fourth column reports 
the results with all IVs included. The fifth column presents the results with 
maternal age dummies included. The last column further includes the 
number of old people living in the household. In addition, joint F -statistics 
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for IV s are reported as well. 
It is shown that the IV s have a good explanatory power for the 
children's sex composition. All the coefficients of the IVs are statistically 
significant, both individually and jointly. It is estimated that with one 
additional paternal brother, the children's sex composition is decreased by 
1.23% on average, with all other control variables included. IS Furthermore, 
the joint F -statistic of IV s for sex composition is larger than lOin column 
(6), which satisfies the criterion of strong instruments (Staiger & Stock, 
1997). 
Table 7 reports the first stage results for having at least one son. Again 
all the coefficients before instruments are jointly significant at a high 10/0 
level. With one more paternal brother, the possibility of having at least one 
son is reduced by 0.220/0 on average. 16 The F-statistic of IVs for having at 
least one son is 7.45, which is a little bit smaller but not significantly less 
than 10. Thus, the IV method in this equation may not suffer from serious 
problems of weak instruments. 
Table 8 presents similar results for the instruments, but with dependent 
variable as the sex of the first child. The coefficients before the instruments 
are statistically significant, both individually and jointly. With one additional 
15 The calculation is as follows: in column (6) of Table 6, the marginal effect of number of paternal 
brothers on sex composition of children equals -0.116+0.077*0.858+0.005*7.523=-0.0123, where 
0.858 is the mean value of mothers' ethnic identity, and 7.523 is the mean value of maternal 
education. 
16 The calculation is as follows: in column (6) of Table 7, the marginal effect of number of paternal 
brothers on the possibility of having at least one son equals 
-0.098+0.059*0.858+0.006*7.523=-0.0022, where 0.858 is the mean value of mothers' ethnic 
identity, and 7.523 is the mean value of maternal education. 
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number of paternal brothers, the possibility that the first child is a boy is 
decreased by 1.470/0 on average. 17 The joint F statistic is larger than lOin 
column (6), which again proves the robustness of the instruments. 
In sum, combining the statistically significant coefficients of all IV s 
and the large joint F-statistics of IVs in the first stage, we consider that the 
set of IV s we proposed is strong in the equations examining child gender and 
gender composition on parental time allocation. 
Table 9 through Table 11 present the second-stage results regarding 
child gender and gender composition on parents' time distribution. Since 
there are three IV s with only one endogenous variable in Equation (1), an 
overidentification test is required in order to examine the validity of the 
extra instruments. A Sargan test is applied to test the overidentification 
restrictions. With a null hypothesis that the IV s are valid, the Sargan test 
regresses the residuals from the second-stage estimates on all IV s and other 
control variables, with the unadjusted R2 obtained. The Sargan statistic is 
then calculated as NxR2, where N is the number of observations. In Tables 9 
- 11, the P-values for the Sargan statistics in most specifications are larger 
than 0.04, except in the specifications of examining child gender on paternal 
time on household chores where the P-values are slightly smaller than 0.04. 
Specifically, the P-values for the Sargan statistics in equations for mothers 
17 The calculation is as follows : in column (6) of Table 8, the marginal effect of number of paternal 
brothers on the possibility of having at least one son equals 
-0 .142+0.087*0.858+0.007*7.523=-0.0147, where 0.858 is the mean value of mothers' ethni c 
identity, and 7.523 is the mean value of maternal education. 
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are much larger than 0.1 in each table. In general there is no sufficient 
evidence to reject the validity of the IV s. It is suggested that at least one of 
the three IV s is valid in the specification. 
The first two columns in Table 9 present the IV estimates of children's 
sex composition on paternal time allocation with all control variables 
included. The last two columns in this table report the corresponding results 
on mothers' time distribution. It is shown in columns (1) - (2) that with a 
one-unit change in children's sex composition which means shifting from all 
girls to all boys, the change in fathers' time distribution between 
employment and household chores is not statistically significant. Similar 
insignificance is demonstrated in column (3) which presents the effect of sex 
composition on maternal time spent on employment. However, a statistically 
significant finding is reported in column (4). It is shown that maternal time 
spent on household chores is decreased by 33.30/0 with an increase in the 
children's sex composition. This coefficient is statistically significant at the 
level of 100/0. Given the mean of maternal chores of 19.516 hours per week, 
this 33.3% decrease refers to a weekly time reduction of 6.5 hours. It is 
suggested that with a high proportion of sons among all children in the 
family, mothers spend less time on household chores than those with a low 
percentage of boys. It is possibly due to an increased female intra-household 
bargaining power. A mother of sons is glorified by the family, and therefore 
is awarded a raised intra-household status, with possibly more leisure and 
40 
less working time. ) 8 
A consistent pattern is presented in Table 10 and Table 11 regarding 
the effects of having at least one son and a first-born son on parental time 
allocation, respectively. Columns (1) - (2) in Table 10 show that having at 
least one son does not have statistically significant impacts on paternal time 
allocation between labor market and households. In addition, maternal time 
spent on employment does not respond to the scenario of having at least one 
boy as well , as shown in column (3). However, a striking finding is 
presented in column (4). Compared to mothers with no sons, mothers with at 
least one son have a reduction of 36.3% in time spent on household chores. 
This coefficient is statistically significant at the 100/0 level. It implies a time 
reduction of approximately 7 hours per week. This pattern is consistent with 
the bargaining story revealed in Table 9. It underlines again the importance 
of a presence of sons on maternal time reduction in household work. 
Table 11 reveals a similar pattern on the effect of sons versus 
daughters on parental time allocation as that presented in Tables 9 - 10, 
though from a perspective of having a first-born son. In columns (1) - (3), it 
is shown that a first-born son does not have a statistically significant 
influence on paternal time distribution between employed work and 
household chores, as well as mother 's time spent on employment. However, 
18 Although a reduced maternal time spent on household chores can be caused by a demonstration 
effect as well , we consider that it may not be the primary reason in th is scenario. It is because that the 
most direct consequence of the demonstration effect with a presence of sons is an increased paternal 
time spent on household chores. However, no such finding is presented in Table 9. 
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in column (4) regarding the effect of first child's gender on maternal time 
spent on household work, it is seen that a mother with a first-born boy 
enJoys a significant time decrease of 27.30/0 in household work, which 
indicates a time reduction of 5.3 hours per week. This coefficient is 
statistically significant at the 10% level. 
Combining the results from Tables 9 - 11, we suggest that sons have a 
consistent impact on parental time allocation which is different from the one 
of daughters. A presence of sons, no matter in the terms of high sex 
composition, at least one son in the family, or a first-born son, decreases 
maternal time spent on household chores -significantly. It is most likely to be 
consistent with the bargaining story. Mothers of sons enjoy a raised status in 
the family, and therefore their time spent on household work is reduced. 
However, the paternal time distribution between labor market and 
households, as well as the maternal time spent on employment, is likely to 
be inelastic with respect to child gender. It seems that both parents ' time 
spent on employed work and paternal time spent on household chores are 
not easily changed with child gender in rural China. A deep analysis of the 
underlying reasons would require a separate study. 
Comparing the results from IV estimation in Tables 9 - 11 with the 
corresponding ones under OLS estimation in Tables 3 - 5, a striking finding 
is that the magnitude of the estimated coefficients on child gender and 
gender composition is consistently smaller in the IV estimation than the 
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corresponding ones in the OLS estimation. It implies that the child gender 
may have picked up some positive impacts of the unobserved factors in the 
function of maternal time spent on household chores. Consistent with the 
story between sex ratio and son preference in China (Edlund, 1999), and the 
influence of patriarchy on couples' time distribution (Cain et al., 1979), we 
consider the possible unobserved factor to be son preference. The detailed 
interpretation is as follows: firstly, there is a positive correlation between son 
preference and biased gender composition. Edlund (1999) indicated a 
possible causal correlation between son preference and the unbalanced sex 
ratios. She argued that the sex ratios biased towards male in China may be 
one of several possible consequences of the traditional son preference. 
Hence there is a positive relationship between son preference and the 
children's sex composition, as well as the possibility of having at least one 
son and a first-born son. Secondly, there is a positive correlation between 
son preference and maternal time spent on household chores as well. Son 
preference lies in a tradition of patriarchy, which can influence the way 
couples distribute their time. Cain, Khanam, and Nahar (1979) explored the 
pattern of couple's time allocation using micro-level data from Bangladesh. 
They found that women in a society with strict patriarchy allocated most of 
their time to home production, while men distributed most of their time to 
income-earning work. Following this logic, women in a society with son 
preference will allocate more time to household work than those living in a 
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society with no son preference. In sum, the unobserved son preference has a 
positive effect on child gender and gender composition. In addition, it also 
has a positive effect on maternal time spent on household chores. In this case, 
we conclude that it is possibly the unobserved son preference that causes the 
problem of endogeneity, and drives the coefficients under OLS estimation 
biased upward, deviating from the corresponding negative coefficients under 
IV estimation. 
Signs of other control variables in the IV estimation, as shown in 
Tables 9 - 11, remain the same as the corresponding ones in OLS estimation. 
Their magnitude, in addition, remains similar. Since we have discussed these 
control variables and their implication in detail in section 5.1 , no further 
explanation will be presented here. What is worth emphasizing is the 
statistically significant and negative coefficient of the number of old people 
in the household. On average maternal time spent on household chores is 
reduced by 30/0 - 4% across each table, with one additional aged people. It 
partly explains the maternal time reduction in chores in the 2SLS estimation. 
The margin for the adjustment in mothers' reduced household chores is 
possibly picked up by the grandparents. 
5.3. Fixed-effects Estimation 
To validate the results from instrumental-variable estimation, we apply 
a different empirical strategy under fixed-effects estimation. As discussed in 
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the preV10US sections, the ma1n problem with the OLS estimation 1S an 
inability to isolate the effects of child gender or gender composition which 
are uncorrelated with the omitted variable of son preference. Since the son 
preference is assumed to be stable across time, and fixed-effects estimation 
can sweep off the household fixed characteristic such as son preference, 
results under fixed-effects estimation should be comparable to the 
corresponding ones under IV estimation. The basic logic of the comparison 
of results obtained from IV method and FE method is as follows: to start 
with, by examining the effect of the exact number of sons versus daughters 
on parental time allocation which is an indirect proxy for sex composition of 
children, we test the validity of the result for sex composition under IV 
estimation. In addition, by examining the effects of at least one son versus at 
least one daughter as well as a first-born son versus a first-born daughter, we 
check the validity of the corresponding IV estimates. 
The data are derived from CHNS conducted in waves of 1989, 1991 , 
1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, and 2006, similarly as that under IV estimation. 
However, different from the strategy in IV method which limits sample to 
parents with at least one child, the data for fixed-effects estimation contain 
couples with and without children, due to the empirical strategy which will 
be described soon. In addition, instead of restricting the first child's age to be 
under 18 in IV estimation, we put an upper limit of mothers' age of 37, with 
a lower bound of 20 years old. Mothers in this age range can have no 
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children or children younger than 18 years old. In this case it corresponds to 
the restriction on the first child's age under IV estimation, and includes 
couples with no children. Taking couples with no children into the sample is 
a strategy corresponding to our empirical specification which will be 
described below. The descriptive statistics of variables are presented in Table 
12. On average 59% of the couples have exactly one son while 42.9% of 
them have exactly one daughter. The proportion of couples having at least 
one boy and at least one girl is 70.80/0 and 55.2%, respectively. Regarding 
the first child's gender, 52.30/0 of the families have first-born sons, and 
44.60/0 of them have daughters as first-born children. The means of other 
variables are as similar as the corresponding ones under IV estimation. Table 
13 tabulates the exact number of children, and Table 14 reports the exact 
number of sons and daughters. It is found that nearly 980/0 of the couples 
have three children or less. Only 0.41 % of families have more than three 
sons, and 1.860/0 of them have more than three daughters. Hence our focus is 
on the effects of the first two sons or daughters on parental time allocation. 
The empirical strategy follows Lundberg & Rose (2002), which tests 
the effects of sons versus daughters on V.S fathers' labor supply and wages. 
The first specification to explore the gender-specific effect is as follows: 
Ln Yil = flo + fll son1 if + fl2 son2if + fl3daughterlil + fl4 daughter 2il 
+ flDDif + X'ilflx + 0i + Y, + Cif 
i = 1, ... , N '; t = 1, ... , T', 
where the subscript i and t indicate household and time separately. 
46 
(3) 
y is the outcome of interest, which IS each parent's time spent on 
employment and household chores. 
sonlit , son2il , daughterl il , and daughter2 i, are a set of dummy 
variables which indicate that the couples have exactly one son, two sons, one 
daughter, and two daughters, respectively. Dj( is a dummy variable which 
equals 1 if the couples have more than two boys or girls. Otherwise it equals 
o. 
XiI is a vector of control variables for individuals, which is the same 
as the one under IV estimation. It includes each parent's age, schooling years, 
ethnic identity, and number of old people living in the household. 
6i stands for household dummies which capture the unobserved 
household-specific heterogeneity. ~ denotes wave dummies capturing the 
time variation in time allocation pattern which is common to all households. 
E i( denotes the error term, which is assumed to be i. i. d, having a zero mean 
and constant variance. 
The differences between having exactly one son and one daughter, as 
well as having exactly two sons and two daughters, can be captured by 
fJl - fJ3' and fJ2 - fJ4' respectively. Although children's sex composition is 
not directly generated in Eq. (3), the effect of sex composition on parental 
time allocation can be picked up by fJl - fJ3' and fJ2 - fJ4' It is because that 
fJl - fJ3 measures the difference between the marginal effects of having 
exactly one son and having exactly one daughter. fJ2 - fJ4 measures the 
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difference between the marginal effects of having exactly two sons and 
having exactly two daughters. Both of them capture the impacts of changes 
in children's gender composition on parental time allocation. In this case, the 
obtained results can be comparable to the corresponding ones under IV 
method. Further discussion will be provided below. 
Furthermore, in order to estimate whether having at least one son can 
exert a different impact from having at least one daughter on parental time 
allocation, dummy variables of dsonil and ddaughtelj, are introduced. They 
refer to the scenarios that the individual has at least one boy or at least one 
girl, respectively. Hence the second specification regarding gender-specific 
effects is: 
Ln Yi/ = Yo + Ytdsonil + Y2ddaughteljt + X'ilY x + c5i + Y, + c it 
i = 1, ... ,N';t = 1, ... ,T', 
Similarly as in Eg. (3), Yt - Y2 captures the difference between having 
at least one son and having at least one daughter. Since the sample for FE 
estimation contains couples with no children, the obtained Yt - Y2 IS 
generally comparable to the effect of having at least one boy in the IV 
estimation, which has a data set containing couples with at least one child. 
In addition, to estimate the effects of first-born sons versus first-born 
daughters on parental time allocation, a third specification is introduced as 
follows: 
Ln Yit = Ao + ~fsonit + A2f daughteljt + X 'it AX + c5i + Y, + cit 




fson il is a dummy variable which equals 1 if a couple has at least one 
child and the first-born child is a boy. Otherwise it equals O. 
fdaughtelj, equals 1 if a couple has at least one child and the first-born child 
is a daughter. Otherwise it equals O. 
A, - A2 measures the difference between having a first son versus 
having a first girl. Similarly as Y) - Y2 in Eq.( 4), A, - A2 corresponds to the 
effect of the first child's gender under IV estimation. 
Table 15 presents the results from fixed-effects estimation of Eq. (3). 
Columns (1) - (2) present the effects of sons versus daughters on paternal 
time spent on employed work and- household chores, respectively. 
Columns (3) - (4) report the corresponding results for mothers. After 
controlling for the household- and time-fixed effects, a striking finding 
regarding child gender composition on parental time allocation is 
demonstrated, which is quite similar to the one under IV estimation. It is 
shown in columns (1) - (3) that having exactly one son does not result in 
statistically significant differences from a scenario of having exactly one 
daughter, on either paternal time distribution between labor market and 
households or mothers' time spent in labor market. Nevertheless, in 
column (4) it is found that compared to mothers with exactly one daughter, 
mothers with exactly one son spend 27.6% less time on household work. 
This coefficient is statistically significant at the level of 100/0. Furthermore, 
this gender-specific effect can be decomposed into time reduction with the 
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presence of exactly one son (-4.8%) and time increase with one daughter 
(22.80/0). Specifically the maternal time increase in chores with a presence 
of exactly one daughter is statistically significant at the 10% level. The 
gender-specific effect is consistent with the bargaining story and 
demonstration effect. On the one hand, with a presence of sons in the 
family, a mother enjoys a raised status, and therefore reduces her time 
spent on chores. On the other hand, due to the demonstration effect from 
mother to daughters, mothers allocate more time to household chores, and 
model the traditional female role for girls. Hence the maternal time spent 
on household chores increases with a presence of daughters. Combining 
the two effects, mothers with exactly one son spend significantly less time 
on household chores than those with exactly one daughter. However, no 
such statistical significance is reported on the effects of two sons versus 
two daughters on maternal chores' time, as well as on other three terms of 
parental time allocation. 
Although this result cannot be a perfect substitution for the children's 
sex composition under IV estimation, they are still comparable. It is because 
that both sexcomit under IV estimation and /31 - /33 under fixed-effects 
estimation measure the effect of sons over daughters on parental time 
allocation. In addition, as reported in Table 13, more than half of the couples 
(52.34%) in the sample have exactly one child. In this case, the difference in 
coefficients before exactly one son and exactly one daughter can be 
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comparable to the one before sex composition In the IV estimation. 
Comparing this result with the corresponding one from OLS estimation in 
Table A I, it is found that the coefficient before "one son - one daughter" is 
biased upward in OLS estimation. Consistent with the story under IV 
estimation, we consider it is again the traditional son preference, which is 
positively correlated with sex composition and maternal time spent on 
household chores that results in the upward bias in the OLS estimation. 
Table 16 reports the effect of having at least one son versus having at 
least one daughter on parental time allocation under fixed-effects estimation. 
Similarly as the results under IV estimation, results presented in columns (I) 
- (3) under FE estimation show that having at least one does not have 
statistically significant impacts on paternal time allocation between 
employed work and household chores, as well as maternal time spent on 
employment. However, as reported in column (4), mothers with at least one 
son have a significant time reduction of 35.20/0 in household chores, 
compared to those with at least one daughter. This coefficient is statistically 
significant at the 50/0 level. In addition, this magnitude under fixed-effects 
estimation is quite similar as the corresponding one under IV estimation, 
which is -36.30/0. It validates the results under IV estimation in examining 
the effect of having at least one son on parental time allocation. 
Table 17 presents the effect of first sons versus first daughters on 
parental time allocation. No results with statistical significance are reported 
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In columns (1) - (3), similarly as those obtained under IV estimation. It 
proves again that first-born sons do not have a statistically significant 
influence on paternal time distribution between employment and household 
work, as well as maternal time in labor market. However, the reported 
coefficient in column (4) is -44.70/0, and is statistically significant at the 5% 
level. It implies that mothers with first-born sons have a time decrease by 
44.7% in household chores than those with first-born girls. The magnitude of 
this coefficient under fixed-effects estimation is quite smaller than the 
corresponding one under IV estimation, which is -27.3%. We consider that it 
may be due to a lack of enough variation in the dummies of 
fson il andfdaughtelj" After all, if the dummies equal 1 in one year, they 
remain the same through the following years, and cannot be changed as the 
number of sons or daughters. 
In sum, the results from fixed-effects estimation reveal a similar 
pattern for the effects of sons versus daughters on parental time allocation as 
the one demonstrated under IV estimation. The estimated coefficients for the 
differences between exactly one son and one daughter, at least one son and 
one daughter, as well as first-born sons and first-born daughters, are all 
negative and statistically significant in the function of maternal time spent 
on household chores. In addition, the magnitude of the corresponding 
coefficients under fixed-effects estimation and IV estimation is quite similar 
with reasonable variation. The results from fixed-effects estimation validate 
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those obtained from IV estimation, and convince us that a presence of sons 
significantly reduces maternal time spent on household chores. 
6. Conclusion 
In this thesis we examIne the effect of sons versus daughters on 
parental time allocation in rural China. We firstly summarize the channels by 
which child gender affects parental time allocation, which are female 
intra-household bargaining power, demonstration, and specialization effects. 
An empirical model is then specified with a data set of 9 provinces in rural 
China for 7 waves. Considering the endogeneity of child gender and gender 
composition, the number of paternal brothers is employed as an instrumental 
variable. It is found that a presence of sons exerts a negative and statistically 
significant impact on maternal chores' time. Specifically, mothers with all 
boys but no daughters have a significant time reduction of 33.30/0 In 
household chores, compared to those with all daughters but no sons. In 
addition, having at least one son and a first-born son decrease maternal time 
spent on household work by 36.3% and 27.30/0, respectively. This pattern is 
consistent with the story that mothers of sons have increased female 
intra-household bargaining power in rural China. However, sons do not have 
statistically significant effects on paterna] time distribution between labor 
market and households, as well as on maternal time spent on employment. A 
deep analysis on the underlying reasons for this inelasticity would call for a 
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separate study. In contrast, the elasticity of maternal time reduction in 
household chores can be explained by a presence of old people in the 
households. The margin for adjustment in maternal reduced chores is 
possibly picked up by the grandparents. We further compare the results 
under IV estimation with the corresponding ones under OLS estimation, and 
suggest the upward biased OLS coefficients in the equation of maternal 
chores' time results from the unobserved heterogeneity in son preference 
across households. These results under IV estimation remain robust under 
fixed-effects estimation. 
Our results corroborate a widely accepted point of view that child 
gender could have a profound influence in intra-household resource 
allocation. As the sex ratio becomes even more biased in China, it is hoped 
that this thesis with its new instrument will stimulate further studies to 
explore the endogeneity of child gender, and the gender bias issues in China. 
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Figures and Tables 
Figure 1 Provinces under China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) in Seven 
VVaves(1989-2006) 
III Province under survey 
Note: In the waves of 1989, 1991 and 1993, provinces under CRNS survey are Liaoning, Shandong, Jiangsu, 
Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guizhou, and Guangxi. In the wave of 1997, the province of Heilongjiang took place 
of Liaoning, with others remaining unchanged. In the waves of 2000, 2004 and 2006, Liaoning was added in 
the survey again, with Heilongjiang remaining in the survey. 
Figure 2 Correlation between Children's Sex Composition and the Number of 
Paternal Brothers in Rural China 
o 2 4 6 
Number of Paternal Brothers 
Note: The graph is drawn by Stata with a method of running-mean smooth. 
Data source: China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) in seven waves. 
8 
The sample is restricted to couples with at least one child, and the oldest child is younger than 18. 
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Figure 3 Correlation between the Possibility of Having At Least One Son and the 
Number of Paternal Brothers in Rural China 
o 
o 2 4 6 
Number of Paternal Brothers 
Note : The graph is drawn by Stata with a method of running-mean smooth. 
Data source: China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) in seven waves. 
8 
The sample is restricted to couples with at least one child, and the oldest child is younger than 18. 
10 
Figure 4 Correlation between the Possibility of Having a First-born Son and the 










o 2 4 6 
Number of Paternal Brothers 
Note: The graph is drawn by Stata with a method of running-mean smooth. 
Data source: China Health and Nutrition Survey (eHNS) in seven waves. 
8 
The sample is restricted to couples with at least one child, and the oldest child is younger than 18. 
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t ~ t + 
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics of Variables in Rural China 
Fathers: 
Time spent on employment (hours/week) a 
Time spent on household chores (hours/week) b 
Age 
Educational years 
Ethnic identity (Han= 1, otherwise=O) 
Mothers: 
Time spent on employment (hours/week) a 
Time spent on household chores (hours/week) b 
Age 
Educational years 
Ethnic identity (Han= 1, otherwise=O) 
Other Variables: 
Number of children 
Sex composition of children 
Whether there is at least one son 
Sex of 1 st chi Id 
Number of fathers' brothers 





































Note: All the couples have at least one child, and the oldest child is younger than 18. 
a Employment includes employment with regular wage income, self employment on farms and self 
employment in gardens . 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 12 Descriptive Statistics of Variables in Rural China 
Fathers: 
Time spent on employment (hours/week) a 
Time spent on household chores (hours/week) b 
Age 
Educational years 
Ethnic identity (Han= 1, otherwise=O) 
Mothers: 
Time spent on employment (hours/week) a 
Time spent on household chores (hours/week) b 
Age 
Educational years 
Ethnic identity (Han= 1, otherwise=O) 
Other Variables: 
Number of Children 
Exactly one son 
Exactly one daughter 
Exactly two sons 
Exactly two daughters 
At least one son 
At least one daughter 
First-born son 
First-born daughter 
Number of old people per household 
Observations 












































a Employment includes employment with regular wage income, self employment on farms and self 
employment in gardens. 
b Household chores include purchasing food, preparing & cooking food, and washing & ironing 
clothes . 
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Table 13 Frequency Distribution: Number of Children in Rural China 





















Table 14 Frequency Distribution: Number of Sons and Daughters in Rural China 
(Percent age in parentheses) 
Households Households 
No sons 423 No daughters 650 
(29.17) (44.83) 
One son 856 One daughter 622 
(59.03) (42.90) 
Two sons 165 Two daughters 151 
(11.38) (10Al) 
Three sons and 6 Three daughters and 27 
above (OA1 ) above (1.86) 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A 4 Description of the Variables in IV estimation 
Variable Description 
Time Spent on Employment 
Time Spent on Household Chores 
Sex Composition of Children 
Having at Least One Son 
Sex of the First Child 




Hours per week spent on 1 st and 2nd jobs with 
regular wage income, self employment on farms, 
and self employment in gardens. 
Hours per week spent on purchasing food, 
preparing & cooking food, and washing & ironing 
clothes. 
The share of male children in all children. 
A dummy equals 1 if a couple has at least one 
son. Otherwise it equals O. 
A dummy equals 1 if the first child IS a boy. 
Otherwise it equals O. 
Exact number of brothers that a father has. 
A dummy equals 1 if an individual belongs to 
Han. Otherwise it equals O. 
Years of education an individual has received. 
A set of dummy variables on fathers' or mothers' 
age. 
Number of Old People In the Exact number of people who are above 65 years 
Household old living in the household. 
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Table A 5 Description of the Variables in FE estimation 
Variable Description 
Time Spent on Employment Hours per week spent on 1 st and 2nd jobs with 
regular wage income, self employment on farms, 
and self employment in gardens. 
Time Spent on Household Chores Hours per week spent on purchasing food, 
preparing & cooking food, and washing & ironing 
clothes. 
(Exactly) One Son 
(Exactly) Two Sons 
(Exactly) One Daughter 
(Exactly) Two Daughters 
At Least One Son 






Number of Old People 
Household 
A dummy variable equals 1 if there is exactly one 
son in the household. Otherwise it equals O. 
A dummy variable equals 1 if there are exactly 
two sons in the household. Otherwise it equals O. 
A dummy variable equals 1 if there is exactly one 
daughter in the household. Otherwise it equals O. 
A dummy variable equals 1 if there are exactly 
two daughters in the household. Otherwise it 
equals O. 
A dummy variable equals 1 if there is at least one 
son in the household. Otherwise it equals O. 
A dummy variable equals 1 if there is at least one 
daughter in the household. Otherwise it equals O. 
A dummy variable equals 1 if there is at least one 
child in the household and the first child is a boy. 
Otherwise it equals O. 
A dummy variable equals 1 if there is at least one 
child in the household and the first child is a girl. 
Otherwise it equals O. 
A dummy equals 1 if an individual belongs to 
Han. Otherwise it equals O. 
Years of education an individual has received. 
A set of dummy variables on fathers' or mothers' 
age. 
In the Exact number of people who are above 65 years 
old living in the household. 
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